v0.11.0 — SecurityAction: privesc / injection / open-port#3
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Unified rare-and-loud, in-kernel-filtered security event on one ring: - setuid-root: setuid/setresuid/setreuid -> (e)uid 0 from non-root (privesc, incl. EPERM-bound attempt). Thread-group-leader gated so glibc NPTL setxid broadcast doesn't fan out one escalation into N events. - ptrace: ptrace(ATTACH|SEIZE) of another process (detail = target pid). - bind: bind() to a fixed non-loopback port (detail = port). Live-validated on Linux 6.8 (all three fire with correct detail, verifier loads clean, 16-thread setuid deduped to one event). Adversarial verify fan-out (4 lenses) before ship; its two medium findings (setreuid gap, per-thread dup) fixed here.
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Adds
AgentEvent::SecurityAction { pid, kind, detail }— one rare-and-loud, in-kernel-filtered event for the security-sensitive syscalls an agent rarely makes but that matter when it does.Kinds (one
SEC_EVENTSring):setuid-root— setuid/setresuid/setreuid → (e)uid 0 from a non-root caller (privesc, incl. the EPERM-bound attempt). Thread-group-leader gated so glibc's NPTL setxid broadcast doesn't fan out one escalation into N duplicate events.ptrace— ptrace(ATTACH|SEIZE) of another process (detail= target pid): injection.bind— bind() to a fixed non-loopback port (detail= port): an off-host-reachable listener.Validation: live on Linux 6.8 — all three fire with correct
detail, verifier loads clean, a 16-thread setuid(0) deduped to one event. Built via an 8-dim enrichment roadmap + a 4-lens adversarial verify fan-out before ship; the verify's two medium findings (setreuid coverage gap, per-thread duplication) are fixed in this PR.Scope:
setgidgroup escalation and loopback-only binds intentionally excluded.